Bulletins and International News Discussion from November 3rd to November 9th, 2025 - The 47th ASEAN Summit + Trump and Xi's Deal

::: spoiler Section 3 - Questions and Discussion

Where are the Sadrists?

I have written about the Sadrists multiple time here, and their story gets weirder and weirder. The best way to understand them is not seeing them as a political movement, but more as a cult in the image of Muqtada Al Sadr and his father Mohammed Sadiq Al Sadr. They haven’t been really interested in actually exercising political power, and when they have done it, they haven’t been good at it. Sadrist governors have ruled in places like Maysan and Dhi Qar before, and the results have been extremely subpar. It’s not easy to effectively govern when a governor is actively waiting for guidance from his spiritual leader Muqtada Al Sadr. Sadrists were the largest bloc in both the 2018 and the 2021 elections, but they failed to leverage that into a serious coalition, nor a major part of the governments that were formed after the elections. In 2021, Al Sadr failed to achieve a ruling coalition, which led to a deadlock that ended with Sadrists storming the Iraqi Parliament, occupying it for months, and in the end getting into firefights with police and military forces and losing. They nearly dragged the country into a civil war if it weren’t for the rumoured intervention of both the US and Iran that calmed everything down in the end. My analysis is that the humiliation in August 2022 made Sadr realise that his movement can’t do effective political work, and that a withdrawal would be less humiliating than getting outmanoeuvred for a 3rd election in a row. All that talk about talk about the country’s political system being corrupt and distrust in democratic institutions is partly true, but it’s mostly cover for the Sadrists’ lack of political instincts and failure to effectively establish themselves as a serious political force, as opposed to their current image of a volatile outsider political movement that waits for Al Sadr to receive some kind of divine guidance before making a decision. I personally like the Sadrists because they’re simple poor people that have been fucked over by the country’s volatility, but their inability to commit to a project is infuriating.

PMU status and US involvement

As Iraq heads into the parliamentary elections, the fight over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) Authority Bill is a major issue. This law aims to better tie the Shia militias that fought ISIS into Iraq's official security forces. But it was pulled back in late August after strong pushback from the U.S. and splits inside Iraq's parliament, leaving it on hold for now. The bill passed a key review in July and would give the PMU more independence, steady pay, and a lasting spot under the Popular Mobilization Commission, rewarding their key role against ISIS from 2014 to 2017. Still, the U.S. and others say it would boost Iran's control through these groups and hurt Iraq's own power, leading to threats of sanctions and tough talks that slowed everything down especially with bigger U.S.-Iraq fights over disarming militias, which Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani ties to a full U.S. troop pullout by late 2026. This delay could widen rifts in the Shia Coordination Framework that facilitated the government formation in 2021, upset Sunni and Kurdish groups who fear PMU meddling in places like Nineveh, and make after-election deals even harder, which might spark protests like those in 2021, while blocking it could lead to attacks from militias guarding their cut of oil deals and building projects. From a Hexbear perspective, the idea of the PMU should be a positive one as a force that counters US influence in the country. But sadly, the PMU is not as disciplined as Hezbollah in Lebanon, nor have the power base that Ansarallah have in Yemen and are the main drivers of religious fundamentalism in the country. Mark Savaya, a Michigan-based cannabis entrepreneur and prominent donor to Trump's campaigns, was appointed as the U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq just last month. Savaya has already signaled a hardline stance against non-state armed groups like the PMU, warning that Iraq's sovereignty hangs in the balance without their full integration into official forces, which could intensify U.S. diplomatic pressure on Baghdad to kill the stalled Authority Bill. His efforts to "dilute Iranian influence" through talks with Iraqi leaders like Prime Minister Al Sudani might sway Shia factions toward concessions on militia disarmament, potentially averting a post-election backlash but risking unrest if perceived as meddling in Iraq's internal power-sharing dynamics.

Government formation?

With projected seats of around 50 for Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani's Reconstruction and Development Alliance, 70+ for Iran-backed PMU-aligned parties, 40-ish for the Sunni Taqaddum led by Mohammed Al Halbusi, 15 for the rival Sunni Azem, and 30 for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), forming Iraq's next government would likely hinge on a broad Shia-Kurdish-Sunni coalition to clear the 165-seat majority threshold for key votes, as no single bloc dominates in this fragmented 329-seat parliament. Sudani's group and the Shia militias could combine for 120 seats, falling short but providing a strong core, adding the KDP's 30 would push it to 150, leaving room to integrate Taqaddum's 40 for a comfortable 190-seat majority that balances ethno-sectarian quotas as usual. A Shia for prime minister (likely Sudani again), Kurd for president (It will probably be the KDP’s turn this time, as the PUK have too much internal issues), and Sunni for parliament speaker (Taqaddum's edge over Azem giving Halbousi leverage). However, this setup risks prolonged haggling, potentially 200+ days as in past elections, over cabinet shares and veto powers, with Shia demands for PMU entrenchment clashing against Sunni and Kurdish pushback on oil revenues and disputed territories like Kirkuk, while sidelining Azem could spark Sunni infighting or protests. If talks collapse, independents or smaller lists (accounting for the remaining 125-ish seats) might tip the scales toward a looser "unity" government, but that could dilute reforms and invite veto blocs, further entrenching the much-criticised Muhasasa (Ethno-religious) system currently in place.

If you have made it this far, congrats! Also you’re a nerd. No proof reading, you can handle it if I misspell or forget a word.