Already in the introduction, there's a LOT of stuff here where I was just nodding along. Like Rodney, I feel like Grandin really gets it.
I think it would have been easy and acceptable to write a book about Latin America as it resisted American Empire over the centuries, as a sort of counterhistory to a hypothetical liberal book about how America has just been great for the world and how they've brought civilization to such and such places through, uh, "interventions". What Grandin is doing instead is a bit more nuanced, and really touches on the dialectical nature of the relationship that the US and Latin America have, which he explicitly states near the end of the introduction. The very varied forms of resistance (and collaboration, as the case may be) from Latin America and the US has actually shaped global American strategy. That is, just as their resistance has adapted to the oppression, the oppression has adapted to the resistance, and in such a way that neither side has ever truly won (yet).
It's in this sense that calling the book "Empire's Workshop" is a great name - as he says, it's not merely America's "backyard" or "sphere of influence" or even really a Roman-esque occupation of a series of provinces, but a place where American strategy is honed and perfected; and when there are newfound forms of resistance, this resistance can be studied and, if you're an American official, hopefully overcome with a new imperial development.
So in a way, Venezuela and especially Cuba aren't merely sanctioned countries, they are the sanctioned countries - they are the experimental ground to test what works and what does not work in terms of depriving and impoverishing entire populations in the hopes of generating regime change, and that model of sanctions is being exported to the rest of the world. Russia, and to a certain and increasing extent China, are where it is truly being put to the test, and so far, thankfully, it doesn't appear to be going very well. This does somewhat mirror how Venezuela and Cuba have maintained socialist political cohesion despite the sanctions pressure, and perhaps reflects a growing inability for the US to successfully exert its economic will on sufficiently ironclad countries. On the other hand, its successes in countries like Argentina, Peru, and now Bolivia inform us of how there is still a successful American imperialist foreign policy able to pressure politically weak countries and even sometimes outright replace leaders and parties, such as in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Armenia.
To summarize my point: one should, when looking at American imperialist strategy as a global phenomenon, always have one eye on Latin America and what the US is up to there, because it has lessons for the present and future of the rest of the world.