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CredibleDefense Megathread

I’m trying this out on a purely experimental basis. Please strive to keep your discussions focused, courteous, and credible. Links to combat footage without significant further analysis will be removed. That sort of footage should be posted to !combatfootage@lemmy.world.

Also, please report things which break the rules! It’s unlikely I’ll see everything that happens in a thread, so reporting is the best way to remove content that doesn’t fit our standards.

The megathread is for asking questions and posting submissions that would not fit the criteria of our post submissions. As such, submissions are less stringently moderated, but we still do keep an elevated guideline for comments. Comment guidelines: ​ Please do: ​

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49 comments

  • ISW posted their latest update on the way in Ukraine

    https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023

    Key Takeaways:

    Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the frontline on July 1.

    US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley acknowledged that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations will take longer than some Western observers had expected.

    Russian officials and sources celebrated claims that Russian forces defeated small-scale Ukrainian landings in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on July 1 as if they had won a major victory.

    The exaggerated Russian praise for defeating a small Ukrainian landing suggests either that the Russian military command sincerely fears a Ukrainian attack on east bank Kherson Oblast or that it is desperate for an informational victory following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion or both.

    Russian forces are likely responding to Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut by pulling forces from elsewhere in Ukraine.

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russians might initiate an intentional radioactive leak at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as part of a potential Russian strategy to freeze the war.

    Russian propagandists are likely conducting an information campaign to destroy the Wagner Group’s reputation as a uniquely effective fighting force in support of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to dismantle the Wagner Group and integrate former Wagner fighters into MoD structures.

    Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.

    Ukrainian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Bakhmut.

    Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks in and transfer airborne (VDV) elements to the Bakhmut area.

    Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.

    Russian forces continued to counterattack recently-liberated Ukrainian positions on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.

    Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

    Russian security procedures on the Kerch Strait bridge are likely slowing down Russian logistics from Russia to occupied Crimea.

    Iran may be sending materiel and personnel to Russia to help construct a factory in the Republic of Tatarstan that will reportedly make Iranian combat drones.

    Ukrainian and Western sources continue to report on the abductions of Ukrainian children and adults in the occupied territories.

    Edit: formatting

  • https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1677435161514737665

    Michael Kofman’s take on DPICM:

    A few thoughts on DPICM. Providing cluster munitions to Ukraine, at this stage, could have a significant impact beyond what other capabilities might achieve. Despite the drawbacks, unlocking this stockpile has important implications for the course of Ukraine's offensive.

    Ukraine's offensive is limited by the artillery ammunition available. The US, and other countries, provided a significant amount for this operation. Much of this was borrowed from South Korea. Without this ammunition it is difficult to imagine this offensive taking place.

    Progress has been slow, difficult, and without sustained breakthroughs thus far. While UA retains the bulk of its combat power, artillery use rate is likely higher than anticipated, especially as the past weeks have seen a largely attritional approach.

    Consequently, Ukraine's hardest limit is proably not manpower, or equipment, but arty ammunition. This is foremost about the numbers. Providing DPICM gives access to a sizable stockpile of artillery ammo that can alleviate the time pressure on UA operations.

    With DPICM the US is also in a much better position to sustain Ukraine's war effort into next year, which requires significant amounts of artillery ammunition on a monthly basis. While other capabilities may be great to have, providing DPICM may prove more impactful.

    While UA retains options, the offensive may culminate whenever the ammunition runs low. Extending that timeline is critical. I wont get into the debate on effectiveness vs the risks, dud rates, etc. My view is these considerations are ultimately best left for Ukraine to weigh.

  • Exclusive: Wagner fighters neared Russian nuclear base during revolt

    As rebellious Wagner forces drove north toward Moscow on June 24, a contingent of military vehicles diverted east on a highway in the direction of a fortified Russian army base that holds nuclear weapons, according to videos posted online and interviews with local residents.

    Once the Wagner fighters reach more rural regions, the surveillance trail goes cold – about 100 km from the nuclear base, Voronezh-45. Reuters could not confirm what happened next, and Western officials have repeatedly said that Russia's nuclear stockpile was never in danger during the uprising, which ended quickly and mysteriously later that day.

    But in an exclusive interview, Ukraine's head of military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, said that the Wagner fighters went far further. He said that they reached the nuclear base and that their intention was to acquire small Soviet-era nuclear devices in order to "raise the stakes" in their mutiny. "Because if you are prepared to fight until the last man standing, this is one of the facilities that significantly raises the stakes," Budanov said.

    The only barrier between the Wagner fighters and nuclear weapons, Budanov said, were the doors to the nuclear storage facility. "The doors of the storage were closed and they didn't get into the technical section," he said.

    Reuters was not able to independently determine if Wagner fighters made it to Voronezh-45. Budanov did not provide evidence for his assertion and he declined to say what discussions, if any, had taken place with the United States and other allies about the incident. He also didn't say why the fighters subsequently withdrew.

    A source close to the Kremlin with military ties corroborated parts of Budanov's account. A Wagner contingent "managed to get into a zone of special interest, as a result of which the Americans got agitated because nuclear munitions are stored there," this person said, without elaborating further.

  • Taiwan’s Impossible Choice: Be Ukraine or Hong Kong

    Great article laying out the debate and difficulties around preparing Taiwan for a possible Chinese attack. Also a great reminder that other countries are watching how this plays out to determine if democracy is really worth the price.

    People in Taiwan have been following every twist of the war in Ukraine. But, while their sympathy for the Ukrainian cause is near-universal, the conclusions for the island’s own future widely diverge.

    To some, the takeaway is that even a seemingly invincible foe can be defeated if a society stands firm, an inspiration for Taiwan’s own effort to resist a feared invasion by China. Others draw the opposite lesson from the images of smoldering Ukrainian cities. Anything is better than war, they say, and Taiwan should do all it can to avoid provoking Beijing’s wrath, even if that means painful compromises.

    “I don’t think anybody rational could look at this and say dialogue is going to change Xi or the CCP,” said Vincent Chao, a former national-security official and Lai’s spokesman, referring to China’s Communist Party. “They see the subjugation of Taiwan as part of their national rejuvenation, as something inherently connected to their political legitimacy. It’s incumbent upon any candidate to be realistic about the situation.” Ukraine, he added, has given Taiwan a “brilliant lesson” in how to defend itself—and how to build coalitions with like-minded democracies.

  • China Tries to Gain U.S. Cooperation Over Upcoming Taiwan Elections

    Taiwan’s coming presidential election loomed large in talks between senior Chinese officials and Antony Blinken during the U.S. secretary of state’s recent visit to Beijing, according to people briefed on the matter.

    The people said Beijing tried to size up Washington’s interest in the race in self-ruled Taiwan, with Chinese officials sharing with Blinken their concerns over the presidential candidate of the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP.

    Chinese officials indicated the political position of Vice President Lai Ching-te, considered by Beijing as a member of the “pro-independence” wing, could exacerbate tensions across the Taiwan Strait, further harming the relations between the U.S. and China, the people briefed on the matter said.

    Lai hails from a DPP camp that is typically more aggressive about asserting Taiwan’s independence than President Tsai Ing-wen, who is barred by term limits from running again. Lai, who once described himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence,” has moderated his position and, as a candidate, has promised to take a practical approach to China.

    In apparent hopes of eliciting U.S. cooperation, the Chinese officials referred to how in 2003, then-President George W. Bush issued a warning to another Taiwan president and DPP leader, Chen Shui-bian, whose policies threatened the cross-strait status quo. With then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao sitting next to him in the Oval Office, Bush bluntly cautioned the Taiwanese government against stoking pro-independence sentiment.

49 comments