Ok, lot to respond to here. I'm familiar with the relevant mathematics.
First, I think it's clear from the litany of failed attempts that you can't write down a finite set of rules that tells us what is true about the world. At least to me, it's also intuitively clear that you can't write down such a set of rules. That is not, without considerable auxiliary claims at least, a consequence of gödel's incompleteness theorem, nor does gödel's incompleteness theorem follow from it.
The essential issue here is that the incompleteness theorem deals with formal statements and formal reasoning in formal languages. There is a significant gap between the perfectly acceptable reasoning we use every day to understand the world around us, which if it can be written down at all often requires us to use informal language, and the sort of thing the incompleteness theorem addresses. There are real philosophical claims to be made and argued, which in at least implicit form go far back and have yet to be pinned down. For example, the sorites paradox can be understood as an (informal) proof that induction can fail in informal arguments. The whole thing, rather than being clarified, becomes more and more hopelessly complex the more one thinks about it.
I agree that inasmuch as objectivism pretends to formality it makes itself vulnerable to mathematical theorems, and surely would evaporate on contact with them. But the failure of the pretense to formality itself renders the issue moot.
Second, the question of what is or is not a "consequence" of this or that theorem is, given the nature of implication, a little difficult to pin down in borderline cases (are not all theorems a consequence of "T -> T"?). I'm perfectly fine with calling cantor's theorem, the halting theorem, the incompleteness theorem, etc instances of lawvere's fixed point theorem. But there is significant work required to take the hypotheses of some of these types of theorems and maneuver things into such a position as to apply the FPT. So I don't think it's a consensus opinion.
Third, if we want to describe a postmodern movement in mathematics, while I'm not sure about the dates, I get what you're going for and it makes sense to me. But I think the description you're putting forth here gives way too much weight to theorems. The movement toward a post-modern sensibility is imo much more marked by a movement toward guiltlessly abstract definitions and axioms. Consider the centuries of the torment that mathematicians experienced trying to justify or explain what negative numbers or complex numbers really are. In contrast, in the 20th century one has the definition of a scheme in algebraic geometry, a kind of space characterized by functions on it which are not really functions and which can be 0 at every point and yet not the zero function. What is the meaning of such a thing? Well, it is up to the individual mathematician to accept their own metaphors explaining that matter. Totally unthinkable a century prior. Examples of this sort of thing abound (for example, test functions in functional analysis). The movement toward such things was doubtless urged on by the impossibility theorems you refer to but goes far beyond them and is far more impactful imo.
unfortunately i don't think there's any way to communicate how significant the gap is without coming off as condescending or churlish. but like qaa is probably my favorite podcast and i too am tormented by this
that is who we reached out to. i think rat material would fit extremely well with what they've got going on and represents a significant gap in their current coverage
this time we looked at gerald schoenewolfe, a "gender centrist" psychoanalyst. lots of discussion of freud in this one
on a side note, we sent off an email hoping to get a podcast network to fund us to do a miniseries on rationalists. i think there's basically no chance this sort of cold call works but 🤞🏼
So guess what Mozilla did? When you update Firefox, tt re-enables the AI! And if you disable the AI again, it re-enables it again next update! Choose correctly, user!
i'll cut the coiners some slack on this one because requiring a login to view is an account level privacy option. i don't know what the option is supposed to accomplish. but that's what it is
the fifth episode of odium symposium, "4chan: the french connection" is now up. roughly the first half of the episode is a dive into sartre's theory of antisemitism. then we apply his theory to the style guide of a nazi news site and the life of its founder, andrew anglin
EDIT: btw if you like the episode please tell people about it! frankly we have no idea how to market or otherwise promote a podcast sooo we're kind of just hoping the listeners do it
fortunately, yud clarified everything in his recent post concerning the zizians, which indicated that... uh, hmm, that we should use a prediction market to determine whether it's moral to sell LSD to children. maybe he got off track a little
Ok, lot to respond to here. I'm familiar with the relevant mathematics.
First, I think it's clear from the litany of failed attempts that you can't write down a finite set of rules that tells us what is true about the world. At least to me, it's also intuitively clear that you can't write down such a set of rules. That is not, without considerable auxiliary claims at least, a consequence of gödel's incompleteness theorem, nor does gödel's incompleteness theorem follow from it.
The essential issue here is that the incompleteness theorem deals with formal statements and formal reasoning in formal languages. There is a significant gap between the perfectly acceptable reasoning we use every day to understand the world around us, which if it can be written down at all often requires us to use informal language, and the sort of thing the incompleteness theorem addresses. There are real philosophical claims to be made and argued, which in at least implicit form go far back and have yet to be pinned down. For example, the sorites paradox can be understood as an (informal) proof that induction can fail in informal arguments. The whole thing, rather than being clarified, becomes more and more hopelessly complex the more one thinks about it.
I agree that inasmuch as objectivism pretends to formality it makes itself vulnerable to mathematical theorems, and surely would evaporate on contact with them. But the failure of the pretense to formality itself renders the issue moot.
Second, the question of what is or is not a "consequence" of this or that theorem is, given the nature of implication, a little difficult to pin down in borderline cases (are not all theorems a consequence of "T -> T"?). I'm perfectly fine with calling cantor's theorem, the halting theorem, the incompleteness theorem, etc instances of lawvere's fixed point theorem. But there is significant work required to take the hypotheses of some of these types of theorems and maneuver things into such a position as to apply the FPT. So I don't think it's a consensus opinion.
Third, if we want to describe a postmodern movement in mathematics, while I'm not sure about the dates, I get what you're going for and it makes sense to me. But I think the description you're putting forth here gives way too much weight to theorems. The movement toward a post-modern sensibility is imo much more marked by a movement toward guiltlessly abstract definitions and axioms. Consider the centuries of the torment that mathematicians experienced trying to justify or explain what negative numbers or complex numbers really are. In contrast, in the 20th century one has the definition of a scheme in algebraic geometry, a kind of space characterized by functions on it which are not really functions and which can be 0 at every point and yet not the zero function. What is the meaning of such a thing? Well, it is up to the individual mathematician to accept their own metaphors explaining that matter. Totally unthinkable a century prior. Examples of this sort of thing abound (for example, test functions in functional analysis). The movement toward such things was doubtless urged on by the impossibility theorems you refer to but goes far beyond them and is far more impactful imo.