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Two U.S. Navy Servicemembers Arrested for Transmitting Military Information to the People’s Republic of China

www.justice.gov Two U.S. Navy Servicemembers Arrested for Transmitting Military Information to the People’s Republic of China

In two separate cases in the Southern and Central Districts of California, two U.S. Navy servicemembers were arrested for transmitting sensitive military information to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

“These individuals stand accused of violating the commitments they made to protect the United States and betraying the public trust, to the benefit of the PRC government,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “The Department of Justice will continue to use every tool in our arsenal to counter threats from China and to deter those who aid them in breaking our laws and threatening our national security.”

“These arrests are a reminder of the relentless, aggressive efforts of the People’s Republic of China to undermine our democracy and threaten those who defend it,” said Assistant Director Suzanne Turner of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division. “The PRC compromised enlisted personnel to secure sensitive military information that could seriously jeopardize U.S. national security. The FBI and our partners remain vigilant in our determination to combat espionage, and encourage past and present government officials to report any suspicious interactions with suspected foreign intelligence officers.”

United States v. Jinchao Wei, Southern District of California

A U.S. Navy sailor, Jinchao Wei, aka Patrick Wei, was arrested yesterday on espionage charges as he arrived for work at Naval Base San Diego, the homeport of the Pacific Fleet. He was indicted for conspiracy to send national defense information to an intelligence officer working for the People’s Republic of China.

The indictment, unsealed this morning, alleges that Wei, was an active-duty sailor on the amphibious assault ship the U.S.S. Essex stationed at Naval Base San Diego. In his role as a machinist’s mate, Wei held a U.S. security clearance and had access to sensitive national defense information about the ship’s weapons, propulsion and desalination systems. Amphibious assault ships like the Essex resemble small aircraft carriers and allow the U.S. military to project power and maintain presence by serving as the cornerstone of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious readiness and expeditionary strike capabilities.

According to the indictment, in February 2022, Wei began communicating with an intelligence officer from the PRC who requested that Wei provide information about the U.S.S. Essex and other Navy ships. Specifically, the Chinese intelligence officer tasked Wei with passing him photos, videos and documents concerning U.S. Navy ships and their systems. The two agreed to hide their communications by deleting records of their conversations and using encrypted methods of communication.

At the request of the intelligence officer, between March 2022 and the present, Wei sent photographs and videos of the Essex, disclosed the locations of various Navy ships and described defensive weapons of the Essex. In exchange for this information, the intelligence officer paid Wei thousands of dollars over the course of the conspiracy.

The indictment further alleges that in June 2022, Wei sent the intelligence officer approximately 30 technical and mechanical manuals. These manuals contained export control warnings and detailed the operations of multiple systems aboard the Essex and similar ships, including power, steering, aircraft and deck elevators, as well as damage and casualty controls. The intelligence officer confirmed with Wei that at least 10 of those manuals were useful to him. For passage of those materials, the indictment alleges that Wei was paid $5,000.

In June 2022, the intelligence officer requested that Wei provide information about the number and training of U.S. Marines during an upcoming international maritime warfare exercise. In response to this request, Wei sent multiple photographs of military equipment to the intelligence officer.

In August 2022, Wei sent an additional 26 technical and mechanical manuals related to the power structure and operation of the Essex and similar ships. The manuals contained warnings that this was technical data subject to export controls and that it was deemed “critical technology” by the U.S. Navy.

The indictment further alleges that in October 2022, Wei sent a technical manual to the intelligence officer describing the layout and location of certain departments, including berthing quarters and weapons systems. Specifically, Wei sent a weapons control systems manual for the Essex and similar ships. This manual contained export-controlled data that could not be exported without a license from the U.S. government. The indictment alleges that Wei knowingly violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations by transmitting this manual to the Chinese intelligence officer without obtaining a required license.

The intelligence officer continued to request information in 2023, including information about the overhaul and upgrades to the Essex. Specifically, he requested blueprints, especially those related to modifications to the flight deck. Wei provided information related to the repairs the Essex was undergoing, as well as other mechanical problems with similar vessels.

During the alleged conspiracy, the intelligence officer instructed Wei to gather U.S. military information that was not public and admonished him not to discuss their relationship and to destroy any evidence regarding the nature of their relationship and their activities.

“We have entrusted members of our military with tremendous responsibility and great faith,” said U.S. Attorney Randy Grossman for the Southern District of California. “Our nation’s safety and security are in their hands. When a soldier or sailor chooses cash over country, and hands over national defense information in an ultimate act of betrayal, the United States will aggressively investigate and prosecute.”

U.S. Attorney Grossman thanked the prosecution team and investigating agencies for their excellent work on this case.

The FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) investigated the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys John Parmley and Fred Sheppard for the Southern District of California and Trial Attorney Adam Barry of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case.

United States v. Wenheng Zhao, Central District of California

A U.S. Navy servicemember, Petty Officer Wenheng Zhao, aka Thomas Zhao, 26, of Monterey Park, California, was arrested following an indictment by a federal grand jury, charging him with receiving bribes in exchange for transmitting sensitive U.S. military information to an individual posing as a maritime economic researcher, but who was actually an intelligence officer from the PRC.

The indictment alleges that Zhao, who worked at Naval Base Ventura County in Port Hueneme and held a U.S. security clearance, received bribes from a Chinese intelligence officer in exchange for violating his official duties as a U.S. sailor by, among other actions, disclosing non-public sensitive U.S. military information.

Beginning in August 2021 and continuing through at least May 2023, at the Chinese intelligence officer’s direction, Zhao allegedly violated his official duties to protect sensitive military information by surreptitiously recording, and then transmitting to the intelligence officer, U.S. military information, photographs and videos. According to the indictment, the Chinese intelligence officer told Zhao that the intelligence officer was a maritime economic researcher seeking the information for investment decisions.

In exchange for bribes, Zhao allegedly sent the Chinese military officer non-public and controlled operational plans for a large-scale U.S. military exercise in the Indo-Pacific Region, which detailed the specific location and timing of Naval force movements, amphibious landings, maritime operations and logistics support.

The indictment further alleges that in exchange for bribes, Zhao also photographed electrical diagrams and blueprints for a radar system stationed on a U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan.

The intelligence officer allegedly directed Zhao to conceal their relationship and to destroy evidence of the unlawful and corrupt scheme.

In exchange for the sensitive information Zhao provided – information Zhao accessed as a result of his position within the U.S. Navy – the Chinese intelligence officer paid Zhao approximately $14,866, the indictment alleges.

“By sending this sensitive military information to an intelligence officer employed by a hostile foreign state, the defendant betrayed his sacred oath to protect our country and uphold the Constitution,” said U.S. Attorney Martin Estrada for the Central District of California. “Unlike the vast majority of U.S. Navy personnel who serve the nation with honor, distinction and courage, Mr. Zhao chose to corruptly sell out his colleagues and his country.”

If convicted, Zhao faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison.

The FBI Los Angeles Field Office’s Counterintelligence and Cyber Division and NCIS investigated the case. IRS Criminal Investigation provided substantial assistance.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Annamartine Salick, Sarah Gerdes, Christine Ro and Kathrynne Seiden of the Terrorism and Export Crimes Section for the Central District of California are prosecuting this case. Trial Attorney Adam Barry of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section is providing substantial assistance.

An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

Updated August 3, 2023

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129 comments

They're both Chinese-American, so I hope this doesn't turn into a racist purge.
- America try not to be racist challenge.(Impossible)
  
  Found in Table B-30 in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  Race
  Color
  Religion
  Retaliation (a.k.a. reprisal)
  Sex/Gender (gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, pregnancy)
  National origin (not nationality)
  Equal pay and compensation
  Age (over 40)
  Disability (physical or mental)
  Genetic Information
  Yeah we have guidance to not discriminate and hire based on national origin. It's better to look at the whole group of people we've hired and realize that there are a small number of people that do this. Still, I have conflicted feelings, and I'm trying my best to beat my biases. This is really the cost of moral actions, and it's worth it.
  
  Working to rid yourself of those biases is absolutely good and worth it. I commend you.
- They are distinctly not Chinese-American, at least one of them isn't. One of them received their citizenship while selling secrets to China. He became a citizen to destroy us easier. These men were purely Chinese.
  
  Oh yeah I feel soon destroyed. They're destroying our freeedoms! Oh no!
  
  Found the Chinese spy.
  
  This incident will be reported.
- This shit absolutely makes life worse for Chinese-Americans and the PRC absolutely doesn't give a fuck about that.
  
  PRC: "Chinese-American? No such thing."
  I feel bad for people whose country considers them a possession.
  My hyphenated-american country doesn't give a shit about me in any way, and I like it that way.
  
  The US kinda considered the chinese workers that built your railways as posession, more so than as humans most definetely.
  
  That's fair.
  Are we doing that now?
  Is it remotely possible that we're treating your own people more like humans than "their people" are?!?!
  Fuck the CCP.
  
  The CCP didn't exist when the USA used Chinese slave labor to build the railroads.
  
  You didn't answer his question, shipmate. Is it happening now? I'd be surprised, given that, as an SSBN submariner and Chinese-American, I have not experienced any of the things you mentioned, nor did my parents or grandparents.
  
  What
- As an American with Chinese Ancestry, I would never even think about giving information to China. As long as I hold US Citizenship, this is home to me.
  (Meaning, if the US for whatever reason turn their back on me and revokes my citizenship, there's no guarantee I won't be giving secrets to whoever offers me a new home. Afterall, I don't have any duty to a country if they no longer recognizes me as a citizen. But hopefully, that doesn't happen. Such as how twice in history they've done so. Eg: Chinese Exclusion Act and Japanese Internment Camps)
  
  Maybe don't tell your employer this lol
  
  Lol I don't work for the government. And as I said, I'm not going to betray the US for as long as I'm a citizen. Of course, I'm not bringing up this in a job interview. But remember, corporations arent countries. If you, say, defect from a country, your new country can protect you from the former one. With corporations, you are still bound by law to not violate any non-disclosure agreements. I mean if it were legal to betray Coca-Cola and sell the Coca-Cola formula, I might actually consider it. There's nothing morally wrong about betraying corporations. But countries are different. Betraying a country endangers everyone's lives. Betraying Coca-Cola isn't gonna affect anyone except maybe a few shareholders.
  I like the Constitution just fine, maybe need some amendments, but overall, the core principles are fine. Corporations? Fuck them, I couldn't care for a corporate trade secret. Who wouldn't sell a coca-cola formula if it were legal?
  
  American with Chinese Ancestry
  Well, are you ABC or someone who received citizenship after arriving in the US at certain age.
- China sets up shop in western countries to keep tabs on/utilize/threaten Chinese living and working abroad into pushing forward things beneficial to China. A few "police stations" were just identified and shut down in Canada.
  
  What does that have to do with what I said?
  
  That these police stations are there to put pressure on Chinese-Americans, and there's no job description or security clearance that will stop this influence.
  
  Not op, but they can lean on US military in the same way.
  
  Ok, but that doesn't mean there needs to be a purge of Chinese-Americans in the U.S. military.
  
  Not at all, but there absolutely should be a review of any soldiers with living relatives in the PRC.
  
  I'm sorry you can't see how racist that is.
  
  That there should be a review of people who have direct relatives living in a country known for co-opting those relationships to spy on other countries?
  Not really racist, just prudent.
  Do note that having direct relatives in any foreign country subjects you to increased scrutiny if you're trying to get a security clearance from the US military.
  
  No one said "direct relatives" until now. It was just relatives before.
  
  Do you care about your extended family? Would you betray your country for your second cousin twice removed on your mother's side? No? Neither would most people.
  That vector of attack isn't much of a concern.
  
  You know this is how security clearances work today right? That when doing a risk assessment you look for ways in which the person in question may be pressured. How would you propose ensuring classified information stays safe? Do you have a solution?
  Note that I am not taking sides in the purge-from-the-military people above. Just that your comment is out of touch with real world concerns.
  
  Do I have to have a solution to say that the one being given- that every Chinese-American soldier is suspect if they have a single relative in China, is a racist policy? How is that not racist?
  
  Well it’s not racist because the standard isn’t every Chinese American, it’s every person who has relatives in a foreign country. You are incorrectly staying what the policy would be to make your point (because even though this story is about Chinese Americans don’t you assume the military also cares if your have relatives in Russia? Or even india? Or any country, especially ine that that isn’t five eyes?).
  And yes you do have to have a solution. I am not in favor of people not being able to criticize societal injustices without a solution, but this isn’t really an injustice. No one has a right to state secrets or jobs that let you access them. Id you cannot show you have thought of the competing interests here and have some idea of what a real world solution to a hard problem might look like or take into account, then your criticism probably isn’t worth listening to (IMO).
  
  "Relatives" could mean anything. "Relatives" could mean a third cousin they've never met. So we're going to be investigating people under suspicion of being traitors to their country because of people they have no actual relationship with, just a shared ancestry? Again, sure sounds racist.
  
  Not racist.
  
  It's literally saying anyone with Chinese relatives is possibly complicit. How is that not racist? If I said we should investigate any soldier with Japanese relatives, wouldn't that be racist?
  
  Anyone with ties to the PRC was the comment I was referring to.
  
  Any Jew could have ties with Israel. If Israel and the U.S. were hostile to each other, should all Jews in the military be investigated?
  
  As a member of the strategic nuclear navy and Chinese-American, I would like to inform you that, to the contrary, having relatives who are foreign nationals, or any connection to foreign nationals, especially adversary nations like the PRC or RF, is a national security risk that is normally and routinely investigated thoroughly before granting any sort of clearance or access to sensitive information. It has nothing to do with race and everything to do with potential for blackmail.
  
  Do you have any idea how silly & pathetically desperate to be correct this makes you seem?
  I'm speaking of China as a hostile foreign country. You made it into a race issue. You did that.
  Fun fact, that is the bare fucking minimum for a national security issue. The same review should happen with people with Russian family as well, since they use the same tactics. Is that ok with you or is "Russian" a race now too?
  
  it's racist. it's also true.
- Based on their actions, I'd say just Chinese. Not very American.
- In their mind, probably not american at all.. lol
- Won't be a little just increased scrutiny, knowing you have a mole is advantageous so long as you know who your mole is.
- I doubt people will directly lose clearance, but some contractors will choose to be a bit more stingy with clearance for naturalized citizens.
- most of time ccp uses or plant its own citizen abroad as mole . if some is skeptical of chinese-american its not their fault but real racist will use this as excuse to be more racist
  
  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been accused of operating secret police stations in countries around the world. These stations are reportedly used to monitor and intimidate Chinese citizens who live abroad, as well as to track and silence critics of the CCP.
  In 2019, the United States Department of Justice indicted two Chinese citizens for operating an illegal Chinese police station in New York City. The station was reportedly used to collect information on Chinese dissidents living in the United States.
  In 2020, a report by Safeguard Defenders, a human rights group, found evidence of more than 100 secret CCP police stations operating in countries around the world. The report also found that the CCP was using these stations to track and harass Chinese citizens who were critical of the government.
  The CCP has denied the existence of these secret police stations, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The stations are a clear violation of the sovereignty of the countries in which they operate, and they pose a serious threat to the freedom of Chinese citizens living abroad.
  In addition to the secret police stations, the CCP has also been accused of using other methods to monitor and intimidate Chinese citizens abroad. For example, the CCP has been known to hack into the phones and computers of Chinese citizens, and it has also been known to use social media to track and harass critics of the government.
  The CCP's efforts to monitor and intimidate Chinese citizens abroad are a serious threat to freedom of speech and expression. These efforts also send a clear message to Chinese citizens that they are not free to speak out against the government, even when they are living outside of China.

129 comments